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Abstract
This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to
study the e¤ects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatil-
ity of private investment and public spending. Our results suggest that
there do exist several regimes of mean growth and growth volatility, de-
pending upon the consumers degree of risk aversion, the tax income yield,
the risk-adjusted return of the agents portfolio, the productivity of public
spending. We nd that public spending is described asymptotically by an
incomplete upper Gamma distribution, while private capital is described
by a power law distribution. Depending upon the values of the parame-
ters of these distributions, growth can be characterized by extreme values
(high volatility) when the return to taxation lies under a certain threshold
and/or when the risk-adjusted return of investing the proceeds of illegal
activities evolves above a given threshold. We provide an empirical illus-
tration of the model.
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1 Introduction
This paper tries to shed some light on the impact of tax evasion and tax cor-
ruption on private investment and government spending, two key determinants
of the growth rate and volatility of per-capita GDP. In poor countries, in which
the public sector is an essential contributor to the economic growth, stagnation
and severe swings in economic growth are related to the decient tax collection
systems which do not allow to provide the minimum amount of public goods
and services necessary for productive activities like infrastructure, education, or
investment (see Friedman et al., 2000). Following the recommendation of the
multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as of the international organizations,
governments are willing to reduce corruption and tax evasion to avoid loss of
tax revenues. But many developing countries still appear to be stuck in a vi-
cious circle of both tax corruption and tax evasion, a phenomenon to which the
theoretical and empirical literature have paid a great attention (see, among oth-
ers, Mauro, 2004). Fighting corruption may be di¢ cult because of rent-seeking
activities and building a technology that detects tax evaders is expensive. As
far as we question the implication for growth and its volatility, a commonly
accepted answer consists in saying that countries in such a situation are likely
to achieve a bad macroeconomic equilibrium, namely the coexistence of a low
growth rate and a high volatility of per-capita GDP. Indeed, according to the
literature, corruption is an important factor contributing to growth volatility
(see Denizer et al., 2000).
In this paper, we maintain that in such situations in which a government is
unable to reduce the level of corruption and tax evasion, an alternative solution
is either to allow the resources of the evaded tax to be invested in equities (by al-
lowing a private equity market to ourish, private capital becomes a substitute
for public spending in the production function), or to raise the productivity
of public spending to attenuate the negative externalities of tax evasion on
productive public expenditure. To develop these ideas, we use a standard port-
folio argument by adopting an open economy stochastic growth model, in line
with previous models like Turnovsky (1993), Grinols and Turnovsky (1993),
Turnovsky (1999). Public goods and private investment are both productive
inputs in the production function.
An important di¤erence with the previous literature is that the risk that
interact with growth is not exogenous, but stems from endogenous sources
: tax corruption and tax evasion. Specically, the uncertainty in the model
comes from the fact that hiding income from the tax administration and o¤er-
ing briberies to inspectors are risky activities. Cheating is an uncertain activity
because there is a probability of being detected and a probability to be con-
fronted to a corrupted inspector. People may decide to shelter themselves from
a tax payment, but at the cost of paying bribes to civil servants. Our results
suggest that there do exist several regimes of mean growth and growth volatility,
depending upon the consumers degree of risk aversion, the tax income yield, the
risk-adjusted return of the agents portfolio, the productivity of public spend-
ing. Importantly, the model considers tax evasion, private capital and public
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spending as endogenous variables and creates a loop between them.
We build upon the idea that tax evasion and tax corruption are non-separable
when tax collection is performed by corruptible inspectors (see Hindricks et al.,
1999, Sanyal et al., 2000). However, our model di¤ers from previous models on
the same topic in several respects. Lin and Yang (2001) also consider a stochas-
tic growth model of tax evasion, but with no specic role for corruption and no
role for public spending as an input in the production function. Chen (2003)
also considers a model of tax evasion with productive public capital. Unlike the
author, we do not consider any optimizing behavior from the government side.
Further, in our model tax evasion generates uncertainty and thus a randomness
on production. Dzhumashev (2007) uses a framework like ours, but his model
applies to a closed economy. In our case, opening the economy allows intro-
ducing wealth e¤ects in the model. Further, by considering a general CRRA
utility function, we show that the impact on capital accumulation of tax cor-
ruption and tax evasion depends upon a trade-o¤ between the risk aversion and
the saving behavior. Finally, Cerquetti and Coppier (2011) address the issue
of the e¤ects of tax evasion and tax corruption on economic growth and they
apply a game-theoretical approach to a Ramsey model. The authors focus on
the strategic behaviors of consumers and bureaucrats and this issue is put of
the scope of this paper.
We obtain closed-form solutions for the steady state invariant distributions.
We nd that public spending is described asymptotically by an incomplete upper
Gamma distribution, while private capital is described by a power law distrib-
ution. These distributions have parameters described by the return to taxation
and the portfolio performance of the evasion and corruption activity. The inter-
esting point is that growth can be characterized by extreme values (high volatil-
ity) when the return to taxation lies under a certain threshold and/or when the
risk-adjusted return of investing the proceeds of illegal activities evolves above
a given threshold.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
model. In Section 3, we study the optimal choice of the domestic agent. Section
4 presents the steady state distributions, while Section 5 contains the results
of a comparative dynamics analysis. Section 6 summarizes the main results
from the formal model and Section 7 presents an empirical illustration on the
Southern African countries. Finally Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
This section presents a continuous time stochastic growth model. We describe
a representative agentchoice and present the dynamics of saving and public
spending in a stochastic environment. The source of uncertainty is not the
technology but tax evasion and tax corruption. Tax People whi are frauding
can be caught, but they may face corruptible bureaucrats to whom they propose
bribes. Tax corruption thus occurs through bribery to avoid paying the penalty
for tax evasion. Tax evasion and tax corruption are risky activities. We assume
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that perceived and objective probabilities of getting caught and of paying bribes
are the same and that the detection technology used by the bureaucrats is
costless.
2.1 Tax fraud and tax corruption as a source of random
income
2.1.1 Production
We consider an open economy called the domestic country and the rest of the
world referred as the foreign country. In each country we consider a society
populated with a continuum of individuals with measure 1. An individual lives
forever (we have innitely lived representative agents). She supplies her labor
force inelastically to the productive sector. for purpose of simplicity we noram-
lize the labor supply to 1. In addition to consumers and rms, politicians live
in both the domestic and foreign economies. They provide a productive input
in public spending nanced out of tax revenue.
Private rms in the domestic economy produce a consumption good with
the following production technology:
c(t) = y(t) = A(t)k(t), A(t) =  [g(t)]1= ;
(k(t); g(t)) 2 [0;+1) [0;+1); (1)
where c(t), y(t) are per-capita consumption and output, k(t) andA(t) are respec-
tively the (private) capital-labor ratio and productivity. The latter is assumed
to depend upon public goods and services (roads, public health, education, etc)
provided by the bureaucrats or politicians and we assume decreasing returns of
the technology for public goods ( > 1). The price of the consumption good is
normalized to 1. g(t) is per-capita public spending. Similarly, the production
technology in the foreign country is given by
c(t) = y(t) = A(t)k(t), A(t) =  [g(t)]1=

;
(k(t); g(t)) 2 [0;+1) [0;+1); (2)
For simplicity, we assume that private capital does not depreciate. g is a pure
public good (government goods and services are neither rival nor excludable).
2.1.2 Tax evasion and tax corruption
Our modelling of tax evasion relies upon Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Yitzhaki (1974). Taxes are used to nance public goods and services. We do
not make explicit the production function of the public good since this is not
important here.
An agent chooses to hide a fraction e(t) of her income from the government
and we assume that 0 < e(t) < 1. Yet, politicians try to detect tax evasion. The
probability of being detected is p (0 < p < 1). A consumer who is detected is
asked to pay the legal tax e(t)y(t) plus a penalty dened as a fraction s of the
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undeclared income, se(t)y(t). is the legal tax rate (0 <  < 1) and we have
a similar denition for the legal tax rate in the foreign country (0 <  < 1).
To avoid paying the penalty, the detected evader can pay a bribe to inspectors.
The latter are corruptible with a probability p1 (0 < p1 < 1). Denoting  the
penalty rate when there are no bribes, we assume that the detected evader can
pay back less than  and we denote b the penalty rate when politicians are
corrupted (b < ).
The penalty rate is thus a random variable
1 =

; w:p: 1  p1
b; w:p: p1
 ; (3)
and the expected value of the penalty rate is E [1] =  = p1b + (1   p1).
Therefore, the random return of a unit of evaded tax is
x1 =

1  ; w:p: p
1; w:p: 1  p
 : (4)
The expected return on a unit of evaded tax is thus E [x1] = x1 = 1   p.
Tax evasion is worth if x1 > 0, which implies p < 1. x1 is a binomial process or
a Poisson process if p ! 0. Assuming that the domestic economy is composed
of an innite number of consumer who behave in a similar way, both processes
tends to a Normal law. Therefore x1 converges to a Normal law with mean x1
and a variance 21 = p(1  p)
2
.
The dynamics of the random gain induced by tax evasion is described by the
following stochastic di¤erential equation (SDE):
dx1(t) = x1e(t)y(t)dt+ 1e(t)y(t)dz1(t); (5)
where z1(t) is a Brownian motion process.
Similarly, in the foreign country we have
dx1(t) = x

1
e(t)y(t)dt+ 1
e(t)y(t)dz1(t); (6)
where z1(t) is a Brownian motion process
2.1.3 Portfolio diversication and the dynamics of wealth
A household spends a fraction of his income in consumption and uses the re-
maining income to buy equities whose values represent a share of the physical
capital of the domestic country and of the foreign country. We assume that the
population size is the same in both countries. We dene
k(t) = kd(t) + kf (t) and k(t) = kd(t) + k

f (t); (7)
where
kd(t) is the domestic per-capita capital owned by the domestic agent,
kf (t) is the domestic per-capita capital owned by the foreign agent,
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kd(t) is the foreign per-capita capital owned by the domestic agent,
kf (t) is the foreign per-capita capital owned by the foreign agent.
Denoting w(t) the average wealth of the domestic agent (per-capita wealth
or saving), nd(t) and nd(t) the shares of domestic and foreign capital in the the
domestic agenttotal wealth, we have
nd(t) =
kd(t)
w(t)
; nd(t) =
kd(t)
w(t)
, w(t) = kd(t) + kd(t): (8)
We have similar relationships for the foreign consumer:
nf (t) =
kf (t)
w(t)
; nf (t) =
kf (t)
w(t)
, w(t) = kf (t) + kf (t): (9)
where w(t) is per-capita wealth in the foreign country. We assume perfect cap-
ital mobility without restrictions on asset trade. We further assume that there
is a demand for portfolio diversication. This implies that nd(t), nd(t); n

f (t)
and nf (t) are strictly positive and less than 1.
Wealth (or saving) is a random variable because the expected return on
tax evasion is a random variable. Each unit of income hidden yields x1 on
average with more or less 1. Assuming that per-capita consumption evolves at
a deterministic rate c(t)dt, we have
dw(t) = f[1   + x1e(t)]A(t)kd(t) + [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)kd(t)(10)
 c(t)gdt+ 1e(t)A(t)kd(t)dz1(t) + 1e(t)kd(t)dz1(t);
from which we deduce the rate of accumulation of assets by the domestic agent:
dw(t)
w(t)
=  (t)dt+ !1(t)dz1(t) + !

1(t)dz

1(t); (11)
where
 (t) = R(t)nd(t) +R
(t)(1  nd(t))  c(t)
w(t)
; (12)
R(t) = (1   + x1e(t))A(t);
R(t) = (1   + x1e(t))A(t):
and
!1(t) = 1e(t)A(t);
!1(t) = 

1
e(t)A(t);
R(t) and R(t) are the gross rates of returns of one unit of capital invested
respectively in the domestic and in the foreign countries. They depend upon
the tax rates, the expected returns of a unit of evaded tax and the proportions
of revenues hidden. !1(t) and !1(t) are the risk of one unit of capital invested
in the home and foreign countries. Therefore R(t)nd(t)+R(t)(1 nd(t)) is the
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gross rate of return of the domestic agents portfolio. For the foreign agent, we
have similar relationships.
We assume that the following inequalities hold simultaneously R(t) > R(t)
and !1(t) > !1(t) or R(t) < R
(t) and !1(t) < !1(t) (this is a standard
assumption in any portfolio model with risky assets). This implies that we
either have x1 > x1 and 1 > 

1, or x1 < x

1 and 1 < 

1. In the rst
case, the expected return from tax evasion and tax corruption is higher but
more risky in the home country than in the foreign country. This happens for
instance when the probability of being caught in the domestic country is lower
in comparison with the same probability in the foreign country (p < p), but
if, upon catching an evader, the government imposes a higher penalty ( >


) because the politicians are less corruptible (p1 < p1). However, this same
situation could also arise with a higher probability of being detected (p > p)
because controls are more frequent), but if, upon being detected, the penalty
rate is lower because politicians are more corruptible ( < 

and p1 > p1).
2.2 The utility function
The consumers preferences are represented by an isoelastic utility function.
We assume that she obtains utility from private consumption. The objective
function is
U = E0
Z 1
0
(1=) (c(t))

e tdt: (13)
We assume that  1 <  < 0;  > 0.  is the time preference rate. 1   
is the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. E0 is the expectation
at time t = 0. Unlike other models developed in the stochastic growth liter-
ature, we assume that public spending do not enhance the marginal utility of
consumption, but only the productivity of private capital. This is a major dif-
ference with, for example, Turnovsky (1999). The reason is that the situation
we consider applies to poor countries, which have no social insurance systems,
where the quality of institutions and governance are too weak to allow the pro-
vision of sound public service to people (for instance, public order and safety
or the provision of medical services), and where political leader are not always
accountable for their actions. Therefore, we do not address issues such as nd-
ing the optimal size of the public sector, or studying the provision of public
spending that maximizes the welfare.
2.3 The dynamics of public spending
Public goods and services are nanced out of tax income. The random return
to income taxation is
(t) =

1(t) = (1 + se(t))A(t)k(t); w:p: p
2(t) = (1  e(t))A(t)k(t); w:p: 1  p (14)
Tax revenue is a random variable and so is per-capita public spending. As-
suming a zero scal balance, the stochastic process describing the dynamics of
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public spending is therefore
dg(t) = 1(t)g(t)
1=dt+ 2(t)g(t)
2=dZg(t); (15)
where Zg(t) is a Brownian motion process and
1(t) = p1(t) + (1  p)2(t)
= k(t) fp(1 + se(t)) + (1  p)(1  e(t))g ; (16)
and
2(t) = p(1  p)2k(t)2

2(1 + se(t))2 + 2(1  e(t))2	 (17)
 22(1 + se(t))(1  e(t)): (18)
(15) is a nonlinear SDE with drift and di¤usion components which both
depend on tax evasion behavior and tax corruption.
3 The optimal choice of the domestic agent
An agent faces the following intertemporal utility maximization problem. She
maximizes (13) subject to the constraint (11) with w(0) = w0.
Proposition 1 The optimal choice of a consumer in the domestic country is
given by the following unique interior solution (see the proof in Appendix 1)8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  ) ec(t)w(t) =    2 [1  ] (!1(t))2 + (!1(t))2 ~n2d
+ 2 [1  ] (!1(t))2  R(t);
~nd(t) =
(1  )A(t) R(t)
[1  ] (!1(t))2
+ 1;
~e(t) =
A(t) x1
[1  ] [1A(t)]2 ~nd(t)
:
(19)
The rst equation is obtained from the equality between the marginal utility
of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth, which leads:
~c(t) = fV 0(w(t))g 1 1 (20)
where V is the value function.
The second equation is an arbitrage equation obtained from the rst-order
condition of the objective function obtained using the Jacobi-Hamilton-Bellman
equation with respect to nd(t). This yields
R(t) AP (w)!1(t)2nd(t) = R(t) AP (w)!1(t)2nd(t); (21)
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where AP (w) is the absolute value of the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient assumed to be constant:
AP (w) =
wV
00
(w)
V 0(w)
: (22)
Equation (21) says that the risk-adjusted gross returns of one unit of capital
invested in the domestic and foreign countries are equalized. The risk can be
decomposed into several components. Its depends upon the share of capital
invested out of total wealth in the domestic and foreign countries, upon the
uncertainty from tax evasion and corruption and upon the agents behavior
towards risk. The risk premium is therefore a function of the degree of relative
risk aversion and of the di¤erence in the uncertainty of fraud and corrupting
bureaucrats in both countries:
R(t) R(t) = AP (w) !1(t)2nd(t)  !1(t)nd(t)2 (23)
The third equation is obtained by equalizing to zero the derivative of the
objective function with respect to e(t). This yields
~e(t) =

1
 AP (w)

x1
21

1


1
yd(t)=w(t)

: (24)
The optimal decision of tax fraud varies positively with the risk-adjusted
return of fraud and with the degree of risk aversion, negatively with the tax
rate and the domestic revenue as share of the agents wealth. A system in
which the tax rate is high is an incentive to cheat. Conversely, the motivation
for a tax fraud diminishes as domestic production represents a high proportion
of an individuals total wealth.
The optimization problem facing the foreign agent is similar, but is not
studied here since our focus is on the domestic country.
The households optimal solution does not lead to a closed-form solution, but
all the variables are determined simultaneously. The solution is well dened if
the three variables lie in the unit interval (0; 1). This requires some assumptions
to guarantee that this holds.
Firstly, using the expression of nd(t) in Appendix 1, the condition 0 <end(t) < 1 is equivalent to imposing a lower and upper bound on R(t):
(1  )A(t) < R(t) < (1  )A(t) + (1  )!1(t)2: (25)
One can interpret nd(t) as the domestic nancial market depth, and also as
the degree of nancial openness. A value near 1 indicates that there are strong
restrictions on the international mobility of capital assets, while a value near 0
reect a situation of perfect mobility and perfect substitution between domestic
and foreign assets. We exclude the situation of preferred habitat where saving
would be entirely invested in either domestic or foreign capital. The above
inequality indicates that this is the case if investing abroad yields a minimum
gross rate of return on each unit of foreign capital owned (the lower bound). To
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avoid a situation of a complete depletion of domestic capital (capital outows
that would lead to end(t) = 0), the foreign gross rate of return must be bounded
above (the upper bound). From (19), it is seen that whenever end(t) > 0, this
inequality also holds for ~e(t) and ec(t)w(t) .
From (19), ~e(t) < 1 if the expected return on one unit of evaded tax, adjusted
by the risk of tax evasion and tax corruption, is bounded above (the gain from
cheating is limited). Formally, ~e(t) < 1 implies the following inequality:
x1
21
< A(t)(1  )end(t): (26)
Finally, the agent does not spend her whole wealth in consumption spending
if the marginal utility of wealth is bounded above. Indeed, in Appendix 1 we
show that ec(t)
w(t)
= [V 0(!)]1= 1 : (27)
Therefore ec(t)
w(t)
< 1; if V 0(!) < !(t) 1: (28)
4 Steady state distributions
4.1 Denition of the equilibrium
For a given sequence of
n
A(t); e(t); enf (t); ec(t)w(t) ; y(t); k(t)o1
0
and initial val-
ues ~e(0), ec(0)w(0) , end(0), g(0), y(0), k(0);the equilibrium is a sequence
A(t); e(t); end(t); ec(t)
w(t)
; y(t); k(t)
1
0
;
where each variable is dened by a distribution, that satises the following
conditions:
i) these variables satisfy the agents optimal choice,
ii) domestic capital growths at the same rate as saving,
iii) the governments budget constraint is described by the SDE (15),
iv) the economys capital and nancial account is balanced.
v) the constraints (25), (26) and (28) apply.
Condition (i) implies that the equilibrium path must satisfy the system (19).
As shown in Appendix 1, the convexity of the maximization problem implies
the unicity of the optimal solution.
Condition (ii) implies that the dynamics of capital obeys the following SDE:
dk(t) =
dw(t)
w(t)
k(t) =  (t)k(t)dt+
1(t)k(t)dZk(t); (29)
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where we have substituted a new di¤usion component 
1(t)dZk(t) for the two
local martingale terms !1(t)dz1(t) and !1(t)dz

1(t) in Equation (11). The solu-
tion of this SDE can be written as
d ln k(t) =

 (t)  1
2

21(t)

dt+
1(t)dZk(t); (30)
which implies
k(t) = k(0) exp
Z t
0
( (s)  1
2
(
1(s))
2)ds

: (31)
Condition (iii) implies that the dynamics of A(t) can be found by applying
the Ito lemma. We have
A(t) =  [g(t)]
1= and dg(t) = e1(t)dt+ e2(t)dzg(t); (32)
where e1(t) = 1(t) [g(t)]1= and e2(t) = 2(t) [g(t)]2= with 1(t) and 2(t)
dened by (16) and (17). Applying the Ito lemma, we have
dA(t) =
e1(t)@A(t)
@g(t)
+
1
2
(e2(t))2 @2A(t)
@g(t)2

dt+ (33)
e2(t)@A(t)
@g(t)
dzg(t);
or
dA(t) = (t)A(t)dt+ (t)A(t)dzg(t); (34)
where
(t) = e1(t)(=g(t)) + (1  

)(=g(t)2)e2(t)2; (35)
(t) = (=g(t))e2(t): (36)
Equation (34) implies
A(t) = A(0) exp
Z t
0
((s)  1
2
((s))2)ds

: (37)
(31) and (37) are not closed-form solutions of (??) and (34) because k(t)
and A(t) also appear in  (t), 
1(t), (t) and (t) and in (19). k(t) and A(t)
are the two important state variables in the model, since they determine the
dynamics of all the other variables. The equilibrium is described by a random
sequence of the variables or by a distribution. Indeed, as is seen from our
equations, the dynamics is the results of a deterministic drift component and
of a di¤usion component where the variance of the variables is used to dene
their distribution. The stochastic nature of the model entirely comesfrom the
uncertain income caused by tax evasion and tax corruption.
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4.2 Su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a long-run
stochastic steady state
We focus on the dynamics of the variables of our model in the neighborhood of
the long-run stochastic steady state. Such a state is characterized, in systems of
SDE, by a steady stable distribution. We study the conditions for the existence
of such a distribution for per-capita GDP. Since the latter depends upon k(t)
and A(t), we check the validity of some conditions for these variables to have a
limit stable distribution. We shall prove the following two propositions:
Proposition 2 k(t) has two bounds 0 and 1. The zero bound is inaccessi-
ble if  s=(
s1)
2 is above a threshold value (here 1=2) and the innite bound is
inaccessible if  s=(
s1)
2 is below a threshold value (1=2).
Proposition 3 A(t) has two bounds 0 and 1. The zero bound is inaccessi-
ble if s=(s)2 is above a threshold value (here 1=2) and the innite bound is
inaccessible if s=(s)2 is below a threshold value (1=2).
Before proving these propositions, we briey explain what they mean. An
exponent s on a variable indicates that the variable is considered in the neigh-
borhood of the random steady state. It is noteworthy that production is possible
with private capital and public spending. But since the latter is nanced out
of tax income, if private capital is nil, then the production becomes nil and
there are neither tax revenues, nor spending. The quantity  s=(
s1)
2 can be
interpreted as a Sharpe ratio indicating the performance of the agents portfo-
lio that consists of domestic and foreign equities (private domestic and foreign
capital). The rst proposition says that, when the performance of the portfolio
is high enough, there is an incentive for cheating and thus the economy never
converges to a situation in which the household decides to consume her whole
wealth without investing in private capital. On the other side, when income is
hidden and invested into productive capital, this increases the amount of tax
income available for the nancing of public goods and services increases, which
raises production and in turn the return to cheating. To avoid a situation in
which the agent would decide to reduce her consumption to zero while invest-
ing all her wealth in private capital, the performance of the portfolio must be
bounded above. It is important to notice that, for given value of p; p1; b; ; s, we
have either  s=(
s1)
2 < 1=2 or  s=(
s1)
2 > 1=2. Therefore, if we would consider
per-capita capital alone, we could not avoid either a depletion or an explosion of
the economy. We therefore need other conditions on public spending, given in
the second proposition. The ratio s=(s)2 can be viewed as a proxy of the risk-
adjusted random income to taxation weighted by the marginal productivity of
public spending (see Equation (19)). For the economy not to extinct (A(t) = 0),
we need a minimum tax income yield (s > 2(s)2). But tax income should be
bounded above to avoid an innite accumulation of public spending that would
yield an innite per-capita output (s < 2(s)2). Again, if we would consider
per-capita spending alone, we could not avoid either a depletion or an explosion
of the economy. This yields four cases (see Table 1)
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If both A and k equal zero or innity, then there is no random steady state
in the economy. Therefore, the set of parameters p; p1; b; ; s must be dened in
such a way that we either have the conditions  s=(
s1)
2 < 1=2 and s=(s)2 >
1=2, or  s=(
s1)
2 > 1=2 and s=(s)2 < 1=2. Since, in the neighborhood of the
random steady state, both variables are attracted towards opposite directions,
the conditions imply that there is an equilibrium value for per-capita output.
The two polar cases gure out two types of economies. On the one hand, if tax
collection systems are e¢ cient and government manage to ght corruption, tax
evasion becomes unattractive and there is a low level of private capital due to low
concealed income. But in turn, the economy will be nanced by a high amount of
public spending. On the other side, cheating and o¤ering bribes to bureaucrats
may be easy, thereby implying high opportunities to invest the earned income in
private equities. In this case per-capita income will be nanced by private capital
at the expense of public spending. In our model, public and private capital are
thus substitutable. One implication is that tax evasion and tax corruption are
not necessarily harmful for growth, provided that there exist equity markets in
which the proceeds of concealed income can be invested. If people have a low
propensity to consume their wealth, but instead a high propensity to save, tax
evasion can be viewed as similar to tax exemption. This is exactly the way the
so-called "tax havens" function. We now prove the propositions.
Proof. We use the following lemma that apply to SDE (see Karlin and Taylor
(1981)).
Lemma. Consider a di¤usion process X(t) = a(t)dt + b(t)ZX(t) where
ZX(t) is a Brownian motion process. Assume that this process has two bounds
r1 and r2. Su¢ cient conditions: the two bounds are inaccessible, if
8x0 2 [r1; r2] ; S(r1) =  1; S(r2) = +1; where
S(x) =
Z x
x(0)
s(u)du, s(x) = exp
(
 2
Z x
x(0)
a(u)
b2(u)
du
)
: (38)
s(x) and S(x) are called respectively the scale density function and the scale
function. In our case, we have
s(k) = [k=k(0)]
 2 s=(
s1)2 ;
S(k) =
k(0)2 
s=(
s1)
2
(
s1)
2
 2 s + (
s1)2
k
 2 s+(
s1)2
(
s1)
2   

s
1
 2 s + (
s1)2
k(0),
and
lim
k!0
S(k) =  1; if 2 s   (
s1)2 > 0;
lim
k!1
S(k) = +1; if 2 s   (
s1)2 < 0:
The proof is similar for A(t).
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4.3 Steady state distribution for g(t)
We prove and comment the following proposition:
Proposition 4 A closed-form expression of the invariant steady-state distri-
bution for public spending is given by the following upper incomplete Gamma
distribution:
P (g) = Ks1K
s
3
 (;Ks2g
 3
 )
 ()
;  2 (1; 3);  = 4  
3   ; (39)
where Ks1 , K
s
2 and K
s
3are constants:
Ks1 =
1
(s2)
2
exp
n
Ks2g(0)
( 3)=
o
;Ks2 =
2s1
(s2)
2 

3   ; (40)
Ks3 =

1
Ks2
( 4+)=( 3)

   3 : (41)
s1 and 
s
2 are (16) and (17) dened in the neighborhood of the random steady
state and
 () =
Z 1
0
g 1 exp( g)dg and  (; y) =
Z 1
y
g 1 exp( g)dg;  > 0; x > 0:
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix 2. Let us comment some of
its implications. In our stochastic growth model, the growth rate of per-capita
GDP is inuenced by the volatility a¤ecting per-capita GDP, or similarly by
the volatility a¤ecting at least one of its components, namely capital or public
spending. The main characteristics of the invariant distribution of public spend-
ing g depends upon the properties of the distribution of an "auxiliary" variable
z = g
 3
 . The distribution of g is an upper incomplete Gamma distribution
dened by using both the upper incomplete Gamma function and the Gamma
function.
Notice that the upper incomplete Gamma function (the numerator of (39))
can be rewritten as follows:
 (;Ks2g
 3
 ) =  ()  (;Ks2z); z = g
 3
 ; (42)
where (;Ks2z) is the lower incomplete gamma function dened by
(;Ks2z) =
Z Ks2z
0
g 1 exp( g)dg: (43)
Therefore, we have
P (g) = Ks1K
s
3

1  eP (;Ks2z) , eP (;Ks2z) = (;Ks2z) () . (44)
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eP (;Ks2z) is the cumulative distribution function for gamma random vari-
able z with shape parameter  and rate parameterKs2 (or with a scale parameter
1=Ks2 which is the reciprocal of the rate parameter). The distribution of z can
be approximated by a Normal distribution, if  > 10, which implies the follow-
ing condition on the productivity of public spending:.  > 0:89. Since, we have
assumed that  > 1, this condition is always true. Therefore the limit distribu-
tion of g can be considered as being the cumulative distribution of a normal law.
The limit invariant distribution is thus symmetric. As a consequence, under the
assumption of decreasing productivity of public spending the "shocks" a¤ecting
public spending and per-capita output in the steady states are Gaussian. Since
 > 1, g has a unimodal distribution and the maximum is such that
z = [(  1] =Ks2 or equivalently gmax = f[(  1] =Ks2g=( 3) : (45)
Since we have a Normal distribution, the scale parameter can be interpreted
as the variance of the distribution. By denition, the Kurtosis of z equals
(6=).The distribution thus displays heavy tails if (6=) > 3 (or, equivalently,
if  < 2) and "normal" tails if  > 2.
As we noticed above, since g depends upon tax income, which in turn varies
randomly according to the intensity of tax evasion and tax corruption, A = g1=
can be interpreted as a public spending externality of tax evasion and corruption.
The above results imply that, for small values of public spending productivity
("small" means lower than 2), public spending externalities can trigger drastic
changes in the asymptotic behavior of per-capita public spending and thus on
per-capita output. In other words, tax evasion and tax corruption can make the
economy become very unstable in terms of the variability of public spending and
per-capita output. The occurrence of "extreme events" in spending is linked
to the fourth-order central moment of z and depends upon both  and the
variables of the tax and corruption system. This is easily seen by noting that
the fourth-order central moment is 4 = [3(2 + )] =(K
s
2)
4. The likelihood
of extreme events increases when 4 is big, or, equivalently when K
s
2 is small.
Given the denition of Ks2 , this implies a low return to income taxation.( low
ratio s1=(
s
2)
2). This happens when p or s (the probability of being caught and
the penalty rate) are small. In other words, tax evasion can make the economy
become very unstable in terms of the variability of public spending and thus
of per-capita output. Thus the model predicts that, over a long period, we
should observe a higher volatility of public spending and of per-capita output
growths in those countries in which the tax collection system is highly decient,
tax corruption is widespread and the productivity of public spending is low.
However, this instability can be reduced if, public goods and services are highly
productive ( > 2).
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4.4 Steady state distribution for k(t)
Proposition 5 The density function of k(t) is a power law density function
with a scaling parameter  =  2(1   s=(
s1)2).:
p(k) =
2d0
(
s1)
2
k  : (46)
where d0 is a normalizing constant.
This density is obtained easily by computing the speed density function as
for public spending (see Appendix 2). We assume that  > 0 which implies
that  s=(
s1)
2 > 1. To avoid that p(k) diverges when k ! 0 , we need to
impose a lower bound to k. This bound exist if k = 0 is inaccessible (in this
case, as shown above, we need  s=(
s1)
2 > 1=2). It is straightforward that the
normalizing constant is dened by C = ( 1)k 1min and this yields d0 = 0:5( 
1)(
s1)
2k 1min . We require at least that the rst moment exists, in which case
 > 2 or  s=(
s1)
2 > 2. The variance is nite if 2 <  < 3 or  s=(
s1)
2 < 5=2
and innite if  > 3 (thus implying heavy tails). Therefore, if p; p1b; s are such
that the performance of the agents portfolio consisting of domestic and foreign
equities is high enough ("high" means above 5=2) then changes in per-capita
capital can give rise to extreme values (or high volatility in domestic capital
accumulation).
5 Impact of tax evasion and tax corruption on
private capital and public spending
We rst discuss the e¤ects of changes in p1, p, b, s on
dw(t)
w(t) (or equivalently
on dk(t)k(t) given our denition of the equilibrium) This amounts to examining the
impact of changes in x1 and 1 on the growth rate of saving. For purpose of
illustration, we consider a situation in which the domestic agent has an incentive
to cheat because she lives in a country where the tax administration is ine¢ cient
in collecting taxes and ghting bribery. We discuss the consequences of a lower
probability of being caught (p1 < 0), or a lower expected penalty if caught
(that happens if  < 0;p1 < 0;b < 0). These changes imply higher
expected return to corruption and tax evasion (x1 > 0) and a lower uncertainty
of fraud activities. An analytical study of a comparative analysis is di¢ cult
because we do not have closed-form solutions. We shall instead use heuristic
arguments, indicating which equations are a¤ected when changes happen.
5.1 Consumption
A decrease in the probability of being caught, or lower penalty rate or higher
probability of facing a corrupted bureaucrat, have the following consequences
on the households consumption decisions. Firstly, this raises the risk-adjusted
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return of the unreported income (x1 increases and 1 decreases). The hidden
income is used to buy foreign equities (or equivalently to hold a fraction of
the the foreign countrys physical capital). The gains from this investment
are consumed (wealth e¤ects on consumption). The wealth e¤ect is captured
by the term  Rt in the consumption equation of (19) (remember that  <
0). This wealth e¤ect reduces saving (and therefore a¤ect the growth rate of
private capital negatively) and its magnitude depends upon the curvature of
the utility function. The higher the domestic agents risk aversion, the stronger
the negative impact on the growth rate of saving. Further, the nancing of
public spending declines as tax evasion raises. This in turn reduces the domestic
gross return of a unit of concealed income, R(t), and therefore leads to a lower
share of the domestic capital held by the household in her total wealth. A
decrease in nd(t) reduces the consumption ratio as shown by the rst term in
the consumption equation ( ec(t)w(t) in (19) is positively related to nd(t)). This in
turn increases the growth rate of saving and therefore has a positive impact
on the growth rate of private. Thirdly, a decrease in p1, p, b, s reduces the
uncertainty of tax evasion (1 decreases) and the risk of domestic equities (!1
decreases). For the agent, this is an incentive to reduces the ratio of consumption
out of her total wealth. This e¤ect is captured by the term 2 [1  ] (!1(t))2 in
the consumption equation in (19). The impact on the growth rate of per-capita
private capital is therefore positive.
The total e¤ects are thus ambiguous. It is natural to ask what the net e¤ect
will be in general in the developing economies. The important point here is
that growth should be a¤ected negatively in case of strong wealth e¤ects. In
the poorest countries wealth ownership is low. Therefore an agent has a lot
to lose if detected when she hides income. As a consequence, this agent would
tend to show a high risk aversion. Conversely, increased wealth levels tend to
diminish the marginal utility of income, thereby generating a reduce aversion to
cheating. Both these arguments should lead to observe a more negative impact
on growth of corruption and tax evasion, through the consumption channel, in
the poorest countries.
5.2 Public spending
In our model tax evasion and tax corruption is equivalent to diverting public
resources that are productive. A decrease in p1, p, b, s results in a higher x1
inducing, all things being equal, an increase in e(t). The latter in turn implies
a decrease in public spending (provided that s in Equation (16) is low enough
such that the term 2(t) dominates the term 1(t)). The magnitude of wasted
public resources associated with tax evasion depends upon the taxation rate  .
The negative public spending externalities increases with the amount of lost tax
income. The e¤ect on per-capita output is negative (because y is a function of
A) with a magnitude which depends on the values of ; p; s and  .
Further, since there is a loop between tax evasion and public spending, a
lower A(t) reduces e(t) but increases nd(t) (19) and thereby a¤ects growth pos-
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itively. Therefore, when the agent internalized the negative externalities of tax
evasion and corruption on public spending, this makes per-capita output in-
crease. If this second round e¤ect dominates, we have a situation in which
public spending is the main driver of per-capita output and the share of private
equity diminishes. Conversely, if the negative externalities dominate, then pro-
duction will be driven by private capital with a lower share of public spending.
Therefore, tax evasion and tax corruption, in addition to impacting produc-
tion also inuence the composition of the growth rate in terms of private and
public investment. On the one side, a higher noncompliance rate and a higher
tax corruption do not help the economy to capitalize on the public spending
externalities. On the other hand, cheating yields individual benets to the tax
payers if there exists an equity market in which the proceeds of the concealed
income can be invested.
6 How do tax evasion and tax corruption a¤ect
the economies? Summary of our results
In the model, the decision to cheat and corrupt a bureaucrat is the result of a
rational choice. This decision generates negative public spending externalities
in the production activity, since the amount of evaded income yields lower tax
revenues that are used to nance public goods and services and which in turn
determine the productivity of capital. But tax evasion and corruption are also
a source of volatility of per-capita GDP, capital, spending and consumption. To
summarize, we have an innitely-lived representative household who must allo-
cate her wealth between consumption, a domestic equity and a foreign equity.
This allocation depends upon the relative risk-adjusted returns of the equities.
The returns are random due to the uncertainty of being caught for non compli-
ance with the tax declaration system, the uncertainty of the punishment (since
bureaucrats may be corrupted). The agent internalizes the potential spending
externalities on production caused by her behavior. Indeed, though she does
not obtain utility from public expenditure, the consumer-producer knows that
tax evasion and tax corruption impact the amount of per-capita spending in
the economy and thus the amount of income she will receive from production.
This knowledge could encourage evasion if the return on the equities generated
by tax evasion is higher enough so that the positive impact on production of a
higher share of private capital exceeds the negative impact of public spending
externality. This is likely to happen if the agent faces a favorable gamble, for in-
stance with a low probability of being caught and convicted and if the likelihood
of paying a bribe when detected is high. A key parameter is also the degree of
risk aversion because the agent may rather decide to consume the extra-income
from cheating. In this case, she would reduce her share of domestic and for-
eign capital out of wealth because, according to her preferences, consuming an
unexpected income (random income) is better then taking part in a gamble.
Tables 2 and 3 display our main ndings.
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Assume that we are in a poor country in which consumers have preferences
characterized by a strong risk aversion and thus by a high curvature of the
utility function (high ). Further consider that the poor country also lacks
developed equity markets, so that the diversion e¤ects of public resources on the
growth rate of output exceeds the positive impact of the internalization of the
negative externalities of tax evasion on public spending. Finally, imagine that
the productivity of public goods and services is low, that the tax administration
faces di¢ culties in collecting taxes and that consumers escape tax payments
by paying bribes to the bureaucrats. According to the tables, this country will
experience a very uncomfortable situation. Indeed, not only will tax evasion and
tax corruption reduce the mean growth, but per-capita output will also be highly
volatile. This implies situations in which tax evasion deepens recessions. There
are several ways in which a government can smooth the cyclical uctuations
of the economy. It can raise the productivity of public spending in order to
reduce the degree of the public spending externality in presence of tax evasion.
Another possibility is to reduce the incentive for cheating by employing an
e¢ cient technology to detect tax evasion or to ght corruption. The government
may also want to limit the negative e¤ects of tax evasion on the mean growth,
by allowing them to invest their ill-gotten benets in equity markets. However,
if agents have a high risk aversion, the wealth e¤ects on consumption will be
important, thereby implying a decrease in their holding of private capital.
Now imagine a country in which a government faces tax noncompliance, but
in which taxpayers want to buy domestic and foreign equities (we assume that
they have a low risk aversion). Assume that, in this country, the productivity of
public spending is low, that people have incentives to pay bribes to government
tax collectors, that income tax evasion is widespread. Finally, let us imagine
that the government is unable to implement an e¤ective ght against corruption
and tax evasion. Again, this country will experiment volatile uctuations of the
output, in addition to possible negative e¤ects on the mean growth rate due to
the diversion of public resources. To reduce the size of the output uctuations,
the government can increase the productivity of public spending. In this case,
since bureaucrats cannot manage to ght tax evasion, such a policy will only
reduce the volatility of public spending; but private capital will still be volatile.
However, the situation is better than the initial situation in which both com-
ponents of the growth rate of per-capita output were volatile. To dampen the
negative e¤ects associated with the diversion of public spending resources, the
government can make the investment in equity markets an attractive activity
to taxpayers by, rstly reducing the tax rate, and, secondly, by improving the
productivity of public spending (these measures increase nd). In this case, pri-
vate equity markets act a substitute for anti-corruption policies and policies to
ght against tax evasion.
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7 An empirical illustration
We now provide an empirical support to the predictions of our model. We
consider a sample of Southern African countries over the years from 2001 to 2011.
We show that they are good candidates for the type of formal model studied in
the paper. Countries include: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia.
7.1 Data
We collect annual data for the following series:
Size of shadow economy. This variable is measured as share of o¢ cial GDP
and considered here as a proxy for tax evasion. Data are taken from Schneider
et al. (2010) and obtained using a MIMIC model. Observations are available
for the years 2001-2007. For the years 2008-2001, we take the average of the
series over the years 2001-2007.
Private investment as share of GDP. This series is taken from the African
Development Bank database. We also compute the volatility of this series by
taking the squared value of the di¤erence between an observation and the mean
of the series.
Control of corruption. We take this variable from the World Banks world-
wide governance indicators, 2012. The indicator is based on Kaufmann et al.
(2010)s paper. This series measures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain (rent-seeking behavior by elites, all forms of
corruption). An increase means a lower corruption level.
Government e¤ectiveness. This variable is also taken from the World Bank
governance indicators and considered as a proxy for the productivity of public
spending. It captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of policy formulation and implementation.
Government total spending as share of GDP. This variable is taken from the
IMF database (International Financial Statistics) and we compute the volatility
by considering the squared of the distance between a given observation and the
mean of the series.
Growth rate of per-capita GDP. This series is taken from the World Bank
Indicators.
S&P Global equity annual change. We consider this variable as a proxy for
the degree of development of domestic equity markets. Data are available for
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. For the other countries of the
sample we take the mean of these four countries.
7.2 Results
Though the formal model is expressed in continuous time, we consider a dis-
cretization of time and give the empirical illustration in a discrete time context.
The objective is not to test the analytical structure per-se, but to test some of
the predictions of the model using the economic data. We consider several panel
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regressions with xed e¤ects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. We use a
GLS estimator and in some regressions a two-step GLS approach. Tables 4 till
11 contain our results.
In Tables (4) and (5) the mean private investment and government expendi-
ture (both as share of GDP) are regressed on the share of shadow economy and
the control of corruption variables. The mean of the growth rate of per-capita
GDP and government e¤ectiveness are used as control variables in respectively
the rst and second regression. As far as the e¤ect of tax evasion is concerned,
the regressions show that it is positively correlated with private investment, but
negatively correlated with public spending. Turning to the control of corrup-
tion, we see that private investment falls as the control of corruption increases
and that the converse conclusion applies for government spending. Finally, as
expected, growth enhances private investment while an improvement in gov-
ernment e¤ectiveness raises government expenditure. These results support a
prediction of the formal model according to which tax evasion and corruption
may exert an asymmetric e¤ect on private capital and public spending. In the
theoretical model, we explained this by the negative externalities of the behavior
of tax evasion on tax income and by the positive returns to cheating on private
saving. An interesting point in the regressions is that the positive correlation
between tax evasion and corruption (which means here a lower control of cor-
ruption) is increased when the variable capturing the development of private
equity markets is added to the explanatory variables. Indeed, in Table (6) the
coe¢ cients of the shadow economy and control of corruption are found to have
a stronger, respectively positive and negative e¤ect on the mean private invest-
ment. This seems consistent with the idea that the e¤ects of tax evasion and
corruption on private capital depends upon the absorption of the proceeds of
cheating by equity markets.
Conversely, when government expenditure (instrumented by its determinants
in Table 5) enters the regression, the magnitude of the e¤ects of both variables
diminishes (see Table 7). The negative sign of the coe¢ cient of government
spending indicates that the private sector does not internalize the negative ex-
ternalities of the illegal activities on public spending (otherwise both variables
would move in the same direction).
If we consider the volatility equations (Tables 8 and 9), it appears that tax
evasion increases the volatility of public spending, but does not a¤ect at all the
volatility of private investment whose coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant.
The e¤ect of the control of corruption on government spending is quite strong
in comparison with its impact on private investment. Indeed, though having
a similar level of signicance (with a Student t-ratio of nearly 2.8), the point
estimate is 25th as high in Table 9 as in Table 8. If we refer to the di¤erent
cases of Table 2 in the formal model, this would suggest that the following
possible situation for the Southern African economies: a situation of highly
volatile public spending and normally volatile private investment, corresponding
to a low incentive for cheating and a low productivity of public spending. The
important role played by this last variable in determining the regime of volatility
for both private investment and public spending seems to be conrmed by the
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regression in Table 10 : when government e¤ectiveness is taken into account, the
coe¢ cient of the control of corruption inates. Moreover, in this regression, we
also add the volatility of private investment (instruments by its determinants in
Table 8) to show that both volatilities (private investment and public spending)
are negatively correlated.
Finally, we consider a growth equation with the mean and volatility of pri-
vate and public spending (instrumented by their determinants). We add the
volatility of exogenous variables (neither linked to tax evasion, nor to the con-
trol of corruption). This variable is computed by considering the residuals of
the equation of the volatility of private investment and by taking the in-sample
forecasts of an AR(1) process applied to the residuals. The mean private in-
vestment and government expenditure appear to have a positive e¤ect on the
growth rate of per-capita GDP (with a stronger and more signicant e¤ect of
private investment), but their volatility negatively a¤ect growth (again with a
stronger magnitude of the volatility of private investment).
INSERT TABLES 4 TILL 11 ABOUT HERE
8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a theoretical model of the e¤ects of tax evasion and
tax corruption on private capital and public spending. These variables are con-
sidered as productive inputs in the production function. The model highlights
several channels through which the mean and volatility of these variables are
a¤ected. We rst stress the role of equity markets, showing that the evasion
outcome for the private sector is not necessarily viewed as a burden, but as an
opportunism and optimal response of individual agents to a governance failure
from the tax administration. Tax evasion and tax corruption create a random
environment - because illegal activities are risky - and the consumer take a port-
folio decision (by choosing the share of private capital to hold) in conjunction
with the evasion rate and her consumption ratio. Equity markets performs here
the same role as a policy of tax exemption. In societies in which the share of pri-
vate investment in percentage of GDP is growing, in which tax cheaters usually
choose to shelter the proceeds of their illegal activities from the o¢ cial nancial
institutions, and in which the productivity of public spending is often low, tax
evasion and tax corruption may contribute to the development of private capi-
tal if people nd an opportunity to invest the proceeds of their illegal activities
in equity markets. We are not claiming that these activities are benecial in a
broader sense for growth, but simply that, conditional of the performance of the
taxation system, tax evasion does not necessarily deepen growth or exacerbates
growth volatility in an environment in which private investment is the result
of a portfolio decision and of a rational choice leading the agents to take their
decisions by comparing the returns to cheating and the risk of being caught
and/or facing a corrupted inspector.
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A second important result is that the returns to tax evasion and tax cor-
ruption in private equity markets, the average tax income and the productivity
of public spending jointly impact the volatility of the economy, through their
inuence on the volatility of private capital and public expenditure. We ev-
idence several regimes of volatility for these variables. It is noteworthy that,
when there is a high incentive for cheating (because the tax collection system
is decient), the negative externalities on public spending can be attenuated
if its productivity is high enough. This implies that there may be a trade-o¤
between tax governance and policies enhancing the e¢ ciency of public goods
and services on the economic growth.
Thirdly, we raise the fact that the threshold values of the parameters which
determine the di¤erent congurations of the mean and volatility of the pro-
ductive inputs are found endogenously by examining the invariant distributions
which prevail in the random steady state. Such distributions depends upon the
specication of the production function. In an AK model in which per-capita
output is a linear function of per-capita private capital and a power function
of per-capita government spending with decreasing returns, we show that the
invariant distribution are respectively described by a power law and an upper
incomplete gamma function.
We conclude by raising that our theoretical arguments seem to found support
in Southern African countries. It is encouraging to nd that the results of the
empirical exercise yield conclusions in favor of the propositions that a) tax
evasion and corruption positively impact the mean growth, b) this correlation
is reinforced when the degree of development of equity markets is added to the
list of regressors, c) private investment and public expenditure are substitutes
once they are instrumented by tax evasion and tax corruption, d) we are able
to identify a regime for the volatility of both variables.
Appendix 1. The optimal choice of the domestic and foreign agents
>We assume that
 1 <  < 0;  > 0: (47)
We dene
V (w(t)) = max
fc(t);e(t);nd(t)g
E0
Z 1
0
(1=) (c(t))

e tdt (48)
subject to the constraint
dw(t)
w(t)
=  (t)dt+ !1(t)dz1(t) + !

1(t)dz

1(t); w(0) = w0: (49)
The optimal program is dened as
V (w(t)) = max
fc(t);e(t);nd(t)g
h
1
 (c(t))
 + V 0(w(t))w(t)	0(t) + 12V
00(w(t))w(t)22!
i
= max
fc(t);e(t);nd(t)g
F (c(t); e(t); nd(t));
(50)
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where
F (c(t); e(t); nd(t)) =
1

(c(t)) + V 0(w(t))w(t)	(t) (51)
+
1
2
V 00(w(t))w(t)22!(t):
V is the value function. F is of class C3 on R3. We dene
	(t) = [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nd(t)+
[1   + x1e(t)]A(t)(1  nd(t)) 
c(t)
w(t)
;
2!(t) = [1e(t)A(t)nd(t)]
2
+ [1
e(t)A(t)(1  nd(t))]2 :
(52)
Using the fact that
	(t)w = [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nd(t)w+[1   + x1e(t)]A(t)(1 nd(t))w c(t);
we obtain
@F (c;e;nd)
@c = c
 1   V 0(w);
@F (c;e;nd)
@e = V
0(w)A(t)nd wx1 + V 00(w)w2 [1A(t)nd(t)]
2
e(t)
@F (c;e;nd)
@nd
= V 0(w) f[1   + x1e(t)]A(t)w   [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)wg ;
+ V 00(w)w2
n
[1e(t)A(t)]
2
nd(t)  [1e(t)A(t)]2 (1  nd(t))
o
:
Hence, we deduce the function F presents an extremum in (~c; ~e; ~nd) given by:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
~c(t) = fV 0(w)g 1 1
~e(t) =  V
0(w)A(t) ~nd(t)wx1
V 00(w)w2[1A(t) ~nd(t)]2
~nd(t) =
 V 0(w)f[1 +x1~e(t)]A(t) [1 +x1~e(t)]A(t)g
V 00(w)w
n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o
+
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o :
(53)
Multiplying the second equation in (53) by ~nd(t), we get
~nd(t)(~e(t) =
 V 0(w)A(t) ~nd2(t)wx1
V 00(w)w2[1A(t)]2 ~nd2(t)
=  V
0(w)A(t) wx1
V 00(w)w2[1A(t)]2
:
~nd(t)(~e(t) =
 V 0(w)A(t) wx1
V 00(w)w2 [1A(t)]
2 (54)
Analogously the Bellman equation for the foreigner is given by:
V (w) = max fc;e;nfg
h
1
 (c
) + V 0(w)w	 + 12V
00(w)w22!
i
= max fc;e;n
f
gF
(c(t); e(t); nf (t))
(55)
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where
F (c(t); e(t); nf (t)) =
1

(c(t)) + V 0(w)w	 +
1
2
V 00(w)(w)2()2!(t):
	(t) = [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nf t)
+ [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nf (t)  c
(t)
w(t) ;
()2!(t) = [1e(t)A(t)nf ]
2
+ [1
e(t)A(t)(1  nf )]2 :
Using the fact that
	(t)w(t) = [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nf (t)w(t)
+ [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)nf (t)w(t)  c(t)
we obtain
@F(c;e;nf )
@c = c
 1   V 0(w);
@F(c;e;nf )
@e = V
0(w)A(t)nf w
x1

+ V 00(w)w2
h
1
A(t)nf (t)
i2
e(t)
@F(c;e;nf )
@nf
= V 0(w)w [1   + x1e(t)]A(t)
  V 0(w)w [1   + x1e(t)]A(t);
+ V 00(w)w2 [1e(t)A(t)]
2
nf (t)
  V 00(w)w2 [1e(t)A(t)]2 (1  nf (t)):
Hence, we deduce the function F  presents an extremum in ( ~c; ~e; ~nf ) given
by: 8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
~c(t) = fV 0(w)g 1 1
~e(t) =  V
0(w)A(t) wx1

V 00(w)w2[1A(t)]
2
(1 ~nf )(t)
~nf (t) =
 V 0(w)f[1 +x1~e(t)]A(t) [1 +x1~e(t)]A(t)g
V 00(w)w
n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o
+
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o :
(56)
Multiplying the second equation in (53) by (1  ~nf (t)), we get
(1  ~nf (t))(~e(t) =  V
0(w)A(t) wx1

V 00(w)w2 [1A(t)]
2 : (57)
Lemma 6 Assume that the restrictions (47) hold. Then F and F  present
respectively a strict local maximum in (~c; ~e; ~nd) and (~c; ~e; ~nf ) dened by (53)
and (56).
Proof. We will prove that F presents a strict local maximum in (~c; ~e; ~nd) dened
by (53). One proceeds exactly in the same way to prove that F  presents a strict
local maximum in (~c; ~e; ~nf ) dened by (56).
Denote by (Hij)1i;j3, the components of the Hessian Matrix of F . Then,
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H11 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@c2 = (   1)~c(t) 2;
H12 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@e@c = 0;
H13 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@nd@c
= 0;
H22 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@e2 = V
00(w)w2 [1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
H21 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@c@e = 0
H23 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@nd@e
= V 0(w)A(t)wx1 + 2V 00(w)w2 [1A(t)]
2
~nd(t)~e(t)
=  V 0(w)A(t)wx1
H33 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@n2d
= V 00(w)w2
n
[1 ~e(t)A(t)]
2
+ [1
~e(t)A(t)]2
o
H31 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@c@nd
= 0
H32 =
@2F (~c;~e; ~nd)
@e@nd
= V 0(w)x1A(t)w + 2V 00(w)w2 [1A(t)]
2
~nd(t)~e(t):
With a isoelastic utility function, the value function is of the following form:
V (w) = w (58)
where
 =
1

 c
w
 1
(59)
Thus,
V 0(w) = w 1;
V 00(w) = [   1]w 2 (60)
Since  < 0, we have  < 0 . Consequently, V 0(w) > 0 and V 00(w) < 0. Thus
H22 < 0 . On the other hand g being a non negative function, we have ~c(t) > 0
for all t 2 R+ and then H11 < 0 since    1 < 0 and H22H11 > 0. Now using
(57), we have
H22H33 =
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t)]
4
( ~nd(t)~e(t))
2
+
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2
= ( V 0(w)A(t) wx1)2 +
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2
= (V 0(w)A(t) wx1)
2
+
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2 :
Consequently,
H22H33  H223 = (V 0(w)A(t) wx1)2 +
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2
  (V 0(w)A(t)wx1)2
=
 
V 00(w)w2
2
[1A(t) ~nd(t)]
2
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2 :
This means that H22H33  H223 > 0 and H11(H22H33  H223) < 0.
Thus, the principal minors associate to the Hessian matrix of F satises
H11 < 0; H22H11 > 0; H11(H22H33  H223) < 0:
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Using (53) and (60), we have8>>>><>>>>:
~e(t) = A(t) x1
[1 ][1A(t)]2 ~nd(t)
~nd(t) =
f[1 +x1~e(t)]A(t) [1 +x1~e(t)]A(t)g
[1 (1+)]
n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o
+
[1
~e(t)A(t)]2n
[1~e(t)A(t)]
2+[1~e(t)A(t)]
2
o :
(61)
and
~nd(t)~e(t) =
A(t) x1
[1  ] [1A(t)]2
(62)
Thus,
[1  ]
n
[1 ~e(t)A(t)]
2
+ [1
~e(t)A(t)]2
o
~nd = [1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t)
  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
+ [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2
That is,
[1  ] [1A(t)]2 ~e2(t)~nd =  [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd
+ (1  )A(t) + (x1A(t))~e(t)
  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
+ [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2
Multiplying this latter identity by ~nd ,
[1  ] [1A(t)]2 ~e2(t)~n2d =  [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~n2d
+ (1  )A(t)~nd + (x1A(t))~nd~e(t)
  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)~nd
+ [1  (1 + )] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd
and using (62),
[1  ] [1A(t)]2

A(t) x1
[1 ][1A(t)]2
2
=
 [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~n2d+
(1  )A(t)~nd + (x1A(t))

A(t) x1
[1 ][1A(t)]2

 
[1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)~nd+
[1  (1 + )] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd
which gives
(A(t) x1)
2
[1 ][1A(t)]2 =
 [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~n2d+
(1  )A(t)~nd + (A(t) x1)
2
[1 ][1A(t)]2 
[1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)~nd+
[1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd:
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or
0 =  [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~n2d+
(1  )A(t)~nd
  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)~nd
+ [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd:
Hence, assuming that ~nd 6= 0, we get
[1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd = (1  )A(t)
  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
+ [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 :
and
~nd =
(1 )A(t) [1 +x1~e(t)]A(t)
[1 (1+)][1~e(t)A(t)]
2 + 1
Set  = [1 ~e(t)A(t)]
2
+ [1
~e(t)A(t)]2. Then
[1  ]~nd = [1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t)  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
+ [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2
(63)
From the Bellman equation (50), we have
V (w) =

1

(~cg) + V 0(w)w ~	 +
1
2
V 00(w)w2~2!

where
~	(t) = [1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t) ~nd(t) + [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)(1  ~nd(t))  ~c(t)w(t) ;
~2!(t) = [1 ~e(t)A(t) ~nd]
2
+ [1
~e(t)A(t)(1  ~nd)]2 :
Note that
~2!(t) = [1 ~e(t)A(t) ~nd]
2
+ [1
~e(t)A(t)(1  ~nd)]2
= ~n2d + [

1
~e(t)A(t)]2 (1  2 ~nd):
From (63),
[1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t)  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t) = [1  ]~nd
  [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2
~	(t) = f[1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t)  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)g ~nd(t)
+ [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)  ~c(t)w(t)
= [1  ]~n2d   [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd
+ [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)  ~c(t)w(t)
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Thus using (58) and the fact that c 1 = V 0(w) yields
w = 1 (~c)
 + V 0(w)w ~	 + 12V
00(w)w2~2!
= 1 ~c
 + w 1w ~	
+ 12[   1]w 2w2~2!
= 1
 
~c
w

w + w ~	
+ 12[   1]w~2!
which after simplication gives
 =

~c
w

+  ~	 +
1
2
[   1]~2!:
Hence replacing ~Psi by its expression in the latter identity, we obtain

1+ =
 
~c
w

+ [1  ]~n2d   [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 ~nd
+  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)   ~c(t)w(t)
+ 12[(1 + )  1]~n2d + 12[(1 + )  1] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 (1  2 ~nd)
= (1  )  ~cw + 2 [1  (1 + )]~n2d   2 [1  (1 + )] [1~e(t)A(t)]2
+  [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t):
(1  )  ~cw  =    2 [1  ]~n2d
+ 2 [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2   [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
Finally 8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
~nd =
(1 )A(t) [1 +x1~e(t)]A(t)
[1 ][1~e(t)A(t)]
2 + 1
(1  )  ~cw  =    2 [1  ]~n2d
+ 2 [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2   [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)
~e(t) = A(t) x1
[1 ][1A(t)]2 ~nd(t)
:
Proceeding as for the domestic country, we can prove that the optimum
equilibrium solution of the Bellman equation for the foreign country is
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
~nf =
[1 +x1~e(t)]A(t) (1 )A(t)
[1 (1+)][1~e(t)A(t)]2
(1  )

~c
w

=     [1   + x1 ~e(t)]A(t)~nf
   [1   + x1~e(t)]A(t)(1  ~nf )
+ 2 [1  ][1  ~e(t)A(t)]2~n2f
+ 2 [1  ] [1~e(t)A(t)]2 (1  ~nf )2
~e(t) = A
(t) x1

[1 ][1A(t)]
2
(1 ~nf (t))
:
and
(1  ~nf (t))~e(t) = A
(t) x1

[1  ] [1A(t)]2
(64)
Appendix 2. Steady state distribution for public spending
We use the following lemma that applies to SDE (see Mandel, 1968, or Karlin
and Taylor, 1981).
Lemma. Let X(t) be a stochastic process described by
dX(t) = a(X)dt+ b(X)dW (t);
where w(t) is a Brownian motion process. this process has a time-invariant
or steady-state density function p(x), if and only if the speed density m(x)
satises Z b2
b1
m(x)dx <1; p(x) = c0m(x),
Z b2
b1
p(x)dx = 1; xX(t);
where c0 is a normalizing constant, b1 and b2 are two bounds and
m(x) =
1
b2(x)s(x)
;
where s(x) is dened in (38).
We consider Equation (15) in the neighborhood of the stationary distribu-
tion:
dg = s1g
1=dt+ s2g
2=dZg(t);
s1 = k
sp(1 + ses) + (1  p)(1  es);
s2 = p(1  p)(s)2(ks)2

2(1 + s(es))2 + 2(1  (es))2	 (65)
 22(1 + s(es))(1  (es)); (66)
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where the index s indicates that we consider the value of a variable on the
steady-state distribution (this could be for instance the mode of the distribu-
tion). We have
m(g) =
1
(s2)
2g4=
exp
(
2s1
(s2)
2
Z g
g(0)
u1=
u4=
du
)
;
or
m(g) =
1
(s2)
2
g 4= exp

  2
s
1
(s2)
2
 
3  

 g(0)( 3)=

+ g( 3)=

;
and nally
m(g) = Ks1g
 4= exp
n
 Ks2g( 3)=
o
;
where
Ks1 =
1
(s2)
2
exp
n
Ks2g(0)
( 3)=
o
and Ks2 =
2s1
(s2)
2
 
3   ;  6= 3:
The time-invariant probability density function p(g) is
p(g) = c0m(g):
To obtain a closed-form of the density function, we show that the invariant
distribution function can be written using the Gamma and upper incomplete
Gamma functions.
Let us write the distribution function as
P (g) =
Z g
0
p(u)du = c0K
s
1
Z g
0
u 4= exp
n
 Ks2u( 3)=
o
du; Ks2 > 0:
The condition Ks2 > 0 implies that  < 3, since 
s
1 > 0. Dene
x = Ks2u
( 3)=:
This implies
u =

1
Ks2
=( 3)
x=( 3); du =

   3

1
Ks2
=( 3)
x3=( 3)dx;
and
lim
u!gx = K
s
2g
( 3)= and lim
u!0
x = +1:
we therefore haveZ g
0
p(u)du = c0K
s
1K
s
3
Z 1
x
x 1=( 3) exp( x)dx;
where
Ks3 =

1
Ks2
( 4+)=( 3)

   3 :
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By denition
 (; x) =
Z 1
x
y 1 exp( y)dy, y > 0;  > 0:
Denoting  = (   4)=(   3) and setting c0 =  (), with
 () =
Z 1
0
y 1 exp( y)dy;
we have
P (g) = Ks1K
s
3
 (;Ks2g
( 3)=)
 ()
;  2 (1; 3) [ (4;+1):
The steady-state density function is thus
p(g) = Ks4g
 1= exp
n
 Ks2g( 3)=
o
where Ks4 =
1
 ()K
s
1K
s
3 ( Ks2)1=(3 ) :
The rst and second moments of the density function are
E(g) =
Z 1
0
gp(g)dg = I:
and
V (g) = E

g2
  (E(g))2 = Ks4 (;Ks2g( 3)=);  = (2   1)= = J
By making a change of variable, we have
I = I() =  Ks4 (Ks2)(2+)=(3 )
Z 1
0
x(2+)=(3 ) exp( x)dx;  = (2 + )
(3  ) ;  < 3;
and an integration by parts yields
I() = I(   1) = ::: = kI(   k);
When k ! 1,  ! 1. Moreover I(   1) < I() and therefore E(g) is
bounded.
The variance is bounded if E

g2

is bounded which is straightforward to
prove using similar arguments. Note that the rst and second moments exist if
 < 3.
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Table 1. Four cases of accessible bounds
 s=(
s1)
2 < 1=2  s=(
s1)
2 > 1=2
s=(s)2 < 1=2 k = 0 is possible k =1 is possible
A = 0 is possible A = 0 is possible
s=(s)2 > 1=2 k = 0 is possible k =1 is possible
A =1 is possible A =1 is possible
Table 2. Impact of tax evasion and corruption on private capital and public
spending
Low incentive for cheating
Impact on Magnitude increases with p; p1; b; s are high (or increase)
Private capital Degree of nancial openness (nd) (+) Wealth e¤ects on consumption ratio
and risk aversion ()
( )Positive externality of public
spending on consumption
p;;  ( )Higher risk of investing in private capital :!1
Public spending
 which inuences the tax
income yield s=(s)2
(+)Output-enhancing public spending
Private capital Equity market depth (nd)
( )Internalization : higher public spending
reduces the agents incentive to accumulate
private capital
Table 2 (continued). Impact of tax evasion and corruption on private capital
and public spending
High incentive for cheating
Impact on Magnitude increases with p; p1; b; s are low (or decrease)
Private capital Degree of nancial openness (nd) ( ) Wealth e¤ects on consumption ratio
and risk aversion ()
(+)Negative externality of public
spending on consumption
p;;  (+)lower risk of investing in private capital :!1
Public spending
 which inuences the tax
income yield s=(s)2
( )Diversion of productive public spending
Private capital Equity market depth (nd)
(+)Internalization : lower public spending
increases the agents incentive to accumulate
private capital
Table 3. Impact of tax evasion and corruption on the volatility of growth
components
Low incentive for cheating High incentive for cheating
1 <  s=(

s
1)
2
< 5=2  s=(

s
1)
2
> 5=2
Low productivity  < 2 High volatility in public spending High volatility in public spending
of public spending Normal volatility in private capital High volatility in private capital
High productivity  > 2 Normal volatility in public spending Normal volatility in public spending
of public spending Normal volatility in private capital High volatility in private capital
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Table 4. Regression 1 : private investment (mean)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Growth R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient -51.91*** 1.07*** -3.61** 0.15*** 0.42 7.96
t-statistics (-7.32) (9.00) (-2.30) (4.50) (0.0)
Note : *, **, *** indicate a coe¢ cient signicant respectively at 10%; 5% and 1%
level of signicance.
Table 5. Regression 2 : Government spending (mean)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Government
e¤ectiveness
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient 391.17*** -1.49*** 134.57*** 89.25*** 0.79 31.09
t-statistics (6.84) (-3.37) (5.99) (6.89) (0.0)
Table 6. Regression 3 : private investment (mean)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Growth
Financial
depth
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient -84.51*** 1.59*** -8.98*** 0.26*** 0.04*** 0.72 23.49
t-statistics (-14.83) (16.53) (-7.29) (10.25) (10.73) (0.0)
Table 7. Regression 4 : private investment (mean)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Government
spending
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient -5.49*** 0.12*** -2.40*** -0.03*** 0.95 158.43
t-statistics (-6.23) (7.25) (-7.64) (-8.83) (0.0)
Table 8. Regression 5 : private investment (volatility)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Growth R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient 16.44** -0.15 5.59*** 0.24*** 0.58 11.86
t-statistics (2.37) (-1.38) (2.85) (6.36) (0.0)
Table 9. Regression 6 : Government spending (volatility)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Government
e¤ectiveness
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient 57.02 5.69** 139.80*** 84.59** 0.11 5.95
t-statistics (0.42) (2.09) (2.89) (2.46) (0.0)
Table 10. Regression 7 : Government spending (volatility)
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Shadow
economy
Control
of corruption
Government
e¤ectiveness
Private invest.
volatility
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient 21.68*** 15.5*** 1471.55*** 654.56*** -80.30 0.86 -174.30
t-statistics (16.20) (8.73) (25.3) (20.52) (-20.80) (0.0)
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Table 11. Regression 8 : Growth of per-capita GDP
Explanatory
variable
Constant
Private inv
(mean)
Gov. spending
(mean)
Private inv.
(volatility)
Gov.spending
(volatility)
Volatility
(others)
R
2
F-stat
Coe¢ cient -6.05*** 5.59*** 0.68*** -6.05*** -0.76*** 8.40*** 0.99 1202
t-statistics (-9.02) (46.50) (38.52) (-15.16) (-84.63) (8.95) (0.0)
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